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SPECIAL WATER DISTRICTS: THEIR HOLE IN WESTERN WATER USE
I. Introduct ion
A. Importance: Special water districts [hereinafter 
water districts] are among the most important type of state 
polictical subdivision particularly in the West where more 
than 95% of the approximately 1000 water districts are 
located.1 Even though water districts only comprise about 
10% of the public and private organizations which deliver 
water for irrigation in the west, they distribute about 50% 
of the total.2 Moreover, both the total acreage irrigated 
and the total population served by special water districts 
has steadily increased since 1920.3
B. Visibility: Despite their relative importance as 
water management institutions, relatively little is known 
about water districts except on a case by case basis for 
those districts involved in public controversy or 
litigation. Systematic evaluation of district performance 
is inhibited by lack of an adequate database both within 
and between states, disinterest by researchers, and less 
obviously, the incredible diversity of water district 
functions, structures, and statutory powers.4 A number of 
recent studies have begun to both further our understanding 
of water districts and to suggest various reforms.5
C. Evolution: The relative anonymity of water
district operations is quickly disappearing due to a number 
of factors. Withdrawal of federal funding to support the
1 . J. Leshy, "Special Water Districts - The Historical 
Background," in J. Corbridge ed. Special Water Districts: 
Challenge for the Future, [hereinafter Corbridge] Boulder, 
Co: U. of Colo, Natural Resources Law Center 1985, 
11-30.1984 .
2 . Id. at 13.
3. Id. at 13-14.
4. T. De Young, "Discretion Versus Accountability: The 
Case of Special Water Districts," at 34-37 in Corbridge, 
supra note 1.
5. See, 1982 Arizona State Law Journal 345-527 
[hereinafter ASLJ]; Corbridge, supra note 1; B. Driver, 
Water Efficiency Program Report, (Western Governors’ 
Association - forthcoming); C. Hobbs, The Special Districts 
of California, Sacramento, CA: The Association of Calif. 
Water Agencies, April 1979; Robert B. Hawkins, Self 
Government by Special District, Stanford, Ca: Hoover 
Institute Press, 1976; Don L. Bowen, Special District 
Government in Arizona, Tucson, AZ: U. of AZ. Press, 1982; 
For an earlier treatment, see J. Bollens, Special District 
Governments in the United States, Berkeley, CA: U. of Cal. 
Press, 1957.
construction of water storage projects as well as other 
water infrastructure requirements has caused considerable 
concern in the west. As water districts turn to the 
private bond market or to the states to raise needed funds, 
the institutional and financial viability of these entities 
is being subjected to close scrutiny. Investors are likely 
to raise questions about district organization and 
management, their financial accountability, and their 
relationship to other water entities in their geographic 
area.
D. Purpose: The purpose of this presentation is to 
first review sources of discontent related to water 
districts followed by an evaluation of recent trends and 
proposals for reform. Special consideration is given to 
improving water use efficiencies either through removing or 
modifying district restrictions on water reallocation or 
improving operating efficiencies witin districts.
II. Challenges to Water Management by Special District
A. Districts as Uncooperative Members of the 
Intergovernmental Community. In a series of reports on 
special districts, the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations concluded that special 
districts tend to create intergovernmental problems, 
distort political processes, and lead to the inefficient 
delivery of services through duplication of services and 
problems in coordination with other units of 
governments.6 These problems are especially evident in 
urban areas. Traditionally, water districts served 
relatively homogeneous rural constituencies. Rapid 
urbanization throughout the west has contributed to a 
situation where roughly 50% of all western water districts 
are found within Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas.7 And rural districts face challenges from thirsty 
municipal and industrial users who increasingly covet water 
used in agriculture.8 Water districts therefore find 
themselves in a complex intergovernmental environment
6 . American Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
[hereinafter ACIR] State and Local Roles in the Federal 
System, (Report A-88), Washington, DC: USGPO April, 1982; 
ACIR, The Problem of Special Districts in American 
Government, (Report a-22) 1964; ACIR, Striking a Better 
Balance, (Report A-45), 1973; ACIR, ACIR State Legislative 
Program, (Report M-94), 1975 at 114-17.
7 . BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1977 
Census of Governments, No. 2, Finances of Special Districts 
1.
8. J. Folk-Williams, Susan Fry, and Lucy Hilgendorf, 
Western Water Flows to the Cities, Santa Fe, NM: Western 
Network, 1985.
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characterized by change and pressure.
1. Demands for Increased Oversight: The 
relatively large failure rate of early water districts led 
to state regulation of district financial activities.9 
Occasional abuses including fraud, embezzlement, and 
misappropriation of public monies by a few water districts 
over the years has contributed to fuller regulation of all 
districts in a number of states.10 More recently, most 
states have begun to integrate and centralize water 
management and planning.11 State audit and review of 
water district fiscal, hydrologic, and other transactions 
consequently has increased.
B. Districts as Undemocratic Governments. Even though 
water districts are political subdivisions of the state, 
they are not creatures of state government nor do they 
provide the range of services commonly associated with 
local government. A review of the hodgepodge of water 
district laws suggests they are strictly tailored to the 
needs and desires of a narrow band of local interests. A 
trend has been toward acreage based voting which tends to 
concentrate control in agricultural hands and in some 
areas, larger landowners.12
1. Legal challenges to water districts’ 
provisions for voting and participation in district affairs 
have appeared. The cases stem from the relatively common 
practice of restricting voting to landowners and to a 
lesser extent, weighting votes in direct proportion to 
economic investment, e.g., one vote per acre.13 In Ball 
v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court 
generally exempted water districts from the one-person, one 
vote principle.
2. Despite federal court rulings, state courts
9 . L. Benson, "Desert Survival: The Evolving Western 
Irrigation District," ASLJ, supra note 5 at 397-400.
10. See Corbridge, supra note 1 at 43-44.
11. U.S. Water Resources Council, State of the States: 
Water Resources Planning and Management, Washington, DC: 
USGPO, 1982; Terry D. Edgmon and Tim De Young, "State 
Models of Water Resources Administration," in John G. 
Frances and Richard Ganzel, eds., Western Public Lands and 
Natural Resources, Montclair, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun, and 
Co., 1985.
12 See M. Goodall, J. Sullivan, and T. De Young,
California Water: A New Political Economy, (1978); M. 
Goodall and J. Sullivan, "Water System Entities in 
California: Social and Environmental Effects," in 
Corbridge, 51- 71.
13. See generally, T. De Young, "Governing Special 
Districts: The Conflict Between Voting Rights and Property 
Privileges," in ASLJ, supra note 5.
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or legislatures may reach contrary conclusions in order to 
reduce the amount of political insularity traditionally 
afforded to water districts.
CASE A.I.: In New Mexico’s Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District, for example, the state legislature 
amended the district’s enabling legislation so that board 
members are now elected by district landowners on a one 
person, one vote basis instead of appointed by district 
courts.14
CASE A.2.: In Utah, members of the governing
boards of conservancy districts are now appointed by the 
Governor from nominees submitted by affected cities and 
counties as opposed to judicial appointment.15
B. Districts as Artificial Obstacles to Efficiency:
Water districts increasingly are criticized for their role 
in the inefficient use of water.16 Ineffeciencies are 
both internal and external to water districts.
1. Internal inefficiencies are the result of past 
and present district policy decisions. Traditionally, 
water has been priced artificially low in reclamation and 
analogous state programs as a form of agriculutural 
subsidy. The primary vehicle for revenue generation in 
water districts is taxation, not user fees. Levy 
assessments, usually related to landownership, are 
generally used to repay long-term capital expenditures 
whereas water tolls are used to cover the variable costs of 
providing services. Water tolls tend to be low in water 
districts which hold rights to water (and therefore do not 
have to pay unit costs) and in districts that provide other 
benefits, e.g., flood protection, not directly related to 
water use. The reliance upon levy assessments allows for 
costs to be distributed over the entire population giving 
agricultural users a substantial subsidy.17 In 
consequence, the price of water is reflective of district 
financial obligations and/or political preferences rather 
than the economic value of the resource. Agricultural 
subsidies both reduce the incentive to conserve water and 
increase the demand for water supply projects. In 
addition, many districts do not meter water nor allow for
14. T. De Young, "Searching for the Milagro Beanfield: The 
Politics of Surface Water Management in New Mexico,"
Public Service, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1981) at 6.
15. Corbridge, supra note 1 at 26.
16 See D. Lee, Political Provision of Water: An 
Economic/Public Choice Perspective in Corbridge 5170; B. 
Gardner, "Institutional Impediments to Efficient Water 
Allocation," Policy Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2: 353 65.
17 La Veen and Stavins, op. cit., at 31.
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internal transfers of water entitlements which further 
impedes efficient allocation within districts.
CASE B.I.I.: New Mexico’s Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District provides flood control and irrigation 
services to an rapidly urbanizing area which includes 
Albuquerque, the state’s largest city.18 The proportion 
of irrigable acreage has declined from about 46 % in 1930 
when the district was formed, to about 21 % in 1980. A 
continuing source of controversy is the district’s levy 
assessment policies. "A" lands, irrigable parcels of one 
acre or larger, are charged a fixed per acre fee 
irrespective of assessed valuation or amount of water 
consumed. (No water tolls are assessed.) "B" lands, 
non-irrigated lands benefitted by district drainage and 
flood control services, are assessed an ad valorem levy 
that is collected by the counties in the district. For a 
number of years, the district kept ”A" land charges 
extremely low so that "B" land levies provided most of the 
district’s revenues. In response to complaints in the late 
1970s, the district adopted a 75/25 cost apportionment 
policy for "B" and "A" lands. Requiring further pricing 
revisions has been proposed but not. adopted in each session 
of the State Legislature during the 1980s.
2. External or societal inefficiencies in water 
use are caused in part by water district rules, federal 
reclamation law, and state water law restrictions on 
transfers of waters between jurisdictions.19 Transferring 
water out. of water districts is difficult due to 
uncertainty about ownership,20 appurtenancy requirements 
in some states where water and land rights cannot be 
severed, opposition by districts where transfer of water 
may impair the ability of remaining users to meet district 
financial obligations, and situations where administrative 
approval (district or state level) is a prerequisite for 
transfers.21 More generally, water districts superimpose 
a system of discretionary administrative law which impedes 
the movement of water outside of their jurisdiction.
CASE B.2.1: Under Arizona law, irrigation 
districts, agricultural improvement districts, and water 
user associations may veto any water transfer both within 
their jurisdiction and the drainage basin of operation.22
18 This case is based on my research which appears in 
"Searching for the Milagro Beanfield," supra note 10.
19 See C. Meyers and D. Tarlock, Water Resource 
Management, Mineola, NY: Foundation Press, 1979 at Chapter 
ITT.
20 Corbridge, supra note 1 at. 24.
21 B. Gardner, op. cit. at 359-60.
22 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 45-172 (5); See L. Mac Donnell,
5
C. Districts as Threats to the Environment. Districts 
have been criticized for their role in creating or ignoring 
environmental degradation. Environmental problems result 
when a water district is singularly concerned with 
providing water to irrigable lands. Traditionally, water 
supply projects have modified the appearance, ecology, and 
access opportunities of riparian habitats. More recently, 
environmental pollution due to agricultural runoff has 
emerged as a major problem in many locales. Responding to 
demands for environmental protection, recreational access, 
and related uses are relatively new challenges which 
confront many water districts.
CASE C.I.: In an April 1, 1986 suit, the Friends
of the Earth have charged that Glenwood Springs’ Colo.
Water Cons. District has violated Colorado’s open record 
law for not allowing access to his files on endangered 
species. Says Albrecht of FOE: "These tax supported water
barons are not elected and their arrogance is beyond 
belief."23
CASE C.2.: Agricultural waste water contaminated
with high levels of selenium and other toxics originating 
in California’s Westlands Water District poisoned livestock 
and migratory waterfowl in and near the Kesterson Wildlife 
Refuge. Westlands was able to negotiate an agreement with 
the Department of the Interior which allowed irrigation and 
drainage discharge until June 30, 1986. This case may have 
political and financial implications for water districts 
throughout the West.
III. Understanding Special Districts: Prerequisite to 
Reform
A. Water Districts Are Public Organizations. Unlike 
private entities, public organizations are characterized by 
their tendency to pursue complex, multiple objectives. 
Moreover, they may pursue intangible and inherently 
conflictual goals.24
1. Security and control over water resources
C. Howe, J. Corbridge, and W. Ahrens, "Guidelines for 
Developing Area-of-Origin Compensation," (Ft. Collins: 
Colorado Water Resources Research Institute) forthcoming al 
8-9.
23 See Ed Marston, "FOE takes the 'Water Boys’ to Court," 
High Country News, April 14, 1986 at 6.
24 See H. Ranney, R. Backoff, and C. Levine, "Comparing 
Public and Private Organizations," in J. Perry and K. 
Kraemer (eds.) Public Management and Private Perspectives, 
Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield, 1983 at 96-7.
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tends to take precedence over efficiency for local water 
management institutions.25
2. Water districts generally have the ability to 
withstand challenges to their discretionary authority and 
to coerce and monopolize water policy within their 
jurisdictions. But at the same time, water districts are 
more subject to public scrutiny that their private 
counterparts.
B. Water Districts Do Hot Promote Irrational 
Policies. Water districts increasingly are criticized for 
inefficient use of water. A common critique proceeds as 
follows: efficient use is technically possible, would save 
money, and is therefore the "rational" course of action in 
an environment of increasing demands and finite supplies. 
Condoning inefficient use -the wont of water districts- is 
therefore irrational. But such analysis commits an 
ecological fallacy; the assumption is made that what is 
rational from a societal level of aggregation is also 
rational at the district level.
1. In practice, the evaluation of costs and 
benefits arc generally confined to the geographic 
boundaries of political jurisdictions.26 In his 
discussion of agricultural subsidies available to water 
districts, Lee observes:
Once people have committed their wealth to decisions 
that make sense from a private perspective, only 
because of private policy, they would suffer a private 
loss if the policy were to be eliminated."27 28
Suggestions for reform are varied but usually include 
changing district pricing policies. Charging a competitive 
price for water may be opposed by influential political 
constituencies in the district who help determine policy by 
service on the district’s board of directors. Water 
district leadership therefore is reluctant to remove 
subsidies which would increase costs to district
25 See F.L. Brown and H. Ingram, Water and Poverty in the 
Southwest, Tucson, AZ: U. of AZ Press forthcoming at 252.
26 See MacDonnell, op. cit., at 49 50.
27 Corbridge at 62.
28. See D. Mann, "Institutional Framework for Agricultural 
Water Conservation and Reallocation in the West: A Policy 
Analysis," in Western Water Institutions in a Changing 
West, Napa, Ca.: John Muir Inst., Vol. 2, 1980, at 45; E.
P. LaVeen and R.N. Stavins, "Institutional Impeidments for 
More Efficient Use and Allocation Irrigation Water in the 
West," Report, Berkeley, Ca.: The Rural America Task Force, 
The Ford Foundation, September, 1981 at 28-32.
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C. Water Districts Are Litigious.
1. Following from the above, differences in the 
level at which costs and benefits are calculated frequently 
lead to conflicts among jurisdictions over the desirability 
of various actions or projects.
2. From the perspective of the public choice 
theorist, a predictable consequence of the underpricing of 
water and restrictions on free trade in water rights is the 
removal of price as a mechanism for resource allocation. 
Litigation is used as an alternative means of reallocating 
water.25 6789
3. Litigation may be preferred as a political 
strategy by private interests who are able to use water 
districts as mechanisms for distributing costs throughout 
the jurisdiction.
D. Water Districts Are Vulnerable. Reliance on a 
single resource, water, makes many water districts 
vulnerable to extremes in weather as well as more subtle 
factors accociated with demographic changes.
III. The Political Feasibility of Suggested Reforms: A 
Selected Review
A. Types of Solutions. Water district reform 
proposals range from abolition and privatization at one 
extreme to the centralization and integration of water 
district discretionary authority into a regional or state 
water management system at the other. Somewhere in the 
middle are proposals for pricing reform, changes in laws 
affecting districts, and exploration of cooperative 
endeavors.
25 See F.L. Brown and H. Ingram, Water and Poverty in the 
Southwest, Tucson, AZ: U. of AZ Press forthcoming at 252.
26 See MacDonnell, op. cit., at 49-50.
27 Corbridge at 62.
28. See D. Mann, "Institutional Framework for Agricultural 
Water Conservation and Reallocation in the West: A Policy 
Analysis," in Western Water Institutions in a Changing 
West, Napa, Ca.: John Muir Inst., Vol. 2, 1980, at 45; E.
P. LaVeen and R.N. Stavins, "Institutional Tmpeidments for 
More Efficient Use and Allocation Irrigation Water in the 
West," Report, Berkeley, Ca.: The Rural America Task Force, 
The Ford Foundation, September, 1981 at 28-32.
29 Corbridge at 59.
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1. Given the independence of water districts, i.e. 
rational, litigious, autonomous public organizations, 
radical transformation of current practices is unlikely.
2. Given the vulnerability of water districts to 
resource constraints and to a lesser extent, public 
scrutiny, significant reform has occurred in some locales, 
largely in response to external threats or water crises.30
B. Regulatory Reform. States have regulated district 
activities in an inconsistent fashion. For example, even 
though water districts are required to report fiscal 
transactions and other data to various state agencies, 
reporting requirements generally are not enforced.
Moreover, comprehensive databases which would enable the 
identification of particularly inefficient or otherwise 
wasteful districts do not exist in most states. Stricter 
enforcement of existing statutes and compilation of 
comprehensive databases on water districts is a proposal 
designed as a necessary step toward efficient and equitable 
regulation. Another possible solution is to require public 
service commission regulation of all special districts who 
charge for services.
1. Evaluation: Significant regulatory reform is
unlikely due to lack of enforcement in some states, 
considerable financial costs, and political opposition from 
water districts particularly from smaller districts that 
tend to be least able to expend time and resources on 
reporting requirements.
C. Organizational Reform. Relatively few states with 
significant numbers of special districts have consolidated 
or merged districts into regional management authorities 
but there are a few precedents.31 More successful are 
local agency format ion commissions which have controlled 
the proliferation of special districts in some states.32
1. Evaluation: Local agency formation
commissions only affect proposed districts whereas 
organizational reform of existing units of government 
entails significant transaction costs and is likely to be 
unsuccessful.
30 Arizona’s 1980 Groundwater Management Act is a case in 
point. See Michael F. McNulty and Gary C. Woodard, 
"Arizona Water Issues: Contrasting Economic and Legal 
Perspectives," Arizona Review, Fall, 1984.
31 With regard to the latter, see Edgmon and De Young, op. 
cit., for a discussion of regional reforms in Florida and 
Nebraska.
32 See Corbridge at 37 39; ACIR, State and Local Roles in 
the Federal System, (Report A-88), at 375-81.
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D. Voluntary, Cooperative Endeavors. Cooperative 
agreements between districts and other units of government 
have a long and varied tradition for water districts. Many 
water districts contract with state and federal resource 
agencies for water supplies, operations and maintenance 
assistance, and other water related functions. Recent 
proposals explore the possibilities of sharing and or 
purchasing water district water resources through 
cooperative agreements.
1. Evaluation. Voluntary transactions between 
water districts who control water and organizations who are 
willing to pay for the use of surplus supplies or even the 
temporary use of permanent supplies33 offers the best, 
short-term solution to increasing demands for finite 
resources. Such solutions are limited by the amount of 
available surplus water or "trade" situations as well as by 
the extent to which negative externalities generate 
opposition from third parties.
33 A recent agreement between the New Mexico Department 
of Fish and Game and the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy 
District is a case in point. The district has agreed to 
let the Fish and Game Department "use" water in a portion 
of the district’s canal system for the development of a 
trout fishery. Logs, rocks, and other impediments will be 
installed to create pools along the canal. It appears to 
be a Pareto solution because the district does not lose any 
water and the Fish and Game Department gains a new 
recreational facility literally at the edge of Albuquerque.
10
